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According to the Threshold Theory (Hampton, 1995, 2007) semantic categorization decisions come about
through the placement of a threshold criterion along a dimension that represents items' similarity to the
category representation. The adequacy of this theory is assessed by applying a formalization of the theory,
known as the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen & Steinberg, 1986), to categorization data for eight natural
language categories and subjecting it to a formal test. In validating the model special care is given to its
ability to account for inter- and intra-individual differences in categorization and their relationship with item
typicality. Extensions of the Rasch model that can be used to uncover the nature of category representations
and the sources of categorization differences are discussed.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
From the work of McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) it is known
that natural language categories do not have fixed extensions. That is
to say, people disagree on the items they are willing to endorse as
category members and individuals do not endorse the same items on
different occasions. This is particularly true of items that are
moderately typical of the category. To the question of whether a
parachute is a member of the vehicle category, for instance, 52% yes
and 48% no responses were given in the McCloskey and Glucksberg
study. Thirty percent of the respondents changed their answer from
the first to the second categorization session. An independent group
of judges awarded the item an average typicality score of 4.38 out of
10. For items at the extreme ends of the typicality scale, respondents
categorized much more consistently. All respondents agreed that the
highly typical car is a vehicle, while no onemade a similar claim for the
atypical apartment. For these items categorization decisions did not
change from one session to the other, either.
According to the Threshold Theory (Hampton, 1995, 2007) a
categorization decision for a particular item comes about through the
assessment of the similarity of the item's representation to the
category's representation. If the assessed similarity exceeds a certain
threshold, the item is endorsed as a category member; otherwise it is
not. The Threshold Theory accounts for the variable extension of
categories by assuming that the threshold criterion can vary from one
person to the other or from one occasion to the other (Hampton,
1995).
The Threshold Theory also reconciles the apparently contradictory
finding (Osherson & Smith, 1997) that items afford both a binary
membership decision and a continuous typicality judgment. The
theory states that both phenomena arise from a single underlying
dimension (i.e., similarity to the category representation) that is
common to all respondents. The relationship between typicality and
this similarity dimension is assumed linear. Every single respondent is
assumed to make a binary cut along the dimension, separating
category members from non-members. Since these cuts are all made
somewhere along the same dimension, averaging across respondents'
binary decisions (1 for yes, 0 for no) results in a continuous degree or
probability of membership measure. Because of inter-individual
differences in the placement of the threshold criterion along the
dimension a monotonically increasing relationship (bounded be-
tween 0 and 1) between similarity and degree or probability of
membership is thus assumed (Hampton, 2007).
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Hampton (1998) provides support for the Threshold Theory's
assumptions by reanalyzing the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978)
data. McCloskey and Glucksberg had one group of participants
categorize 492 items in 18 categories. Another group was asked to
provide typicality ratings for the same material. Averaging the binary
membership decisions across respondents resulted in a probability of
membership measure that displayed the hypothesized relation with
the average typicality ratings (i.e., similarity to the category
representation). Probability of category membership monotonically
increased with typicality, starting at a probability of zero at the low
end of the typicality range, demonstrating a profound rise among the
moderately typical items, and attaining a probability of one at the high
end of the typicality range. The resulting curves for individual
categories were very similar in shape to the ones in Fig. 2 (to be
presented later) that were obtained in a study that we conducted
ourselves and will be discussed in detail below. Furthermore,
Hampton (1998) established the correlation between average
typicality and normalized membership probability (a transformation
of membership probability that would show a straight line function
with typicality if the membership curve followed the cumulative
normal distribution function) at .93 (across all categories).
The above procedure clearly supports the Threshold Theory, but is
limited as a formalization thereof. For one, it does not incorporate all
of the Threshold Theory's assumptions. The procedure is, for instance,
agnostic as to whether all respondents' decisions actually display the
structure the Threshold Theory proclaims. Is the probability of
endorsing atypical items as category members lower than the
probability of endorsing typical items in all individuals? Or is there
a significant group of respondents for which the probability of
endorsing an item as a category member is the same, regardless of
typicality? Such divergences would not be picked up by the Hampton
(1998) procedure if the remaining participants were to adhere to the
Threshold Theory assumptions. These divergences would be lost in
the averaging process instead. Related to this issue is perhaps the
greatest shortcoming of the Hampton (1998) procedure: It lacks a
clear counterpart for the threshold criterion notion. Individual
respondents' categorization criteria are not made explicit, making it
difficult to test hypotheses regarding the sources of individual
differences therein. For instance, it is not clear how one would go
about testing whether two groups of categorizers employ a different
threshold along a common scale based on their respective member-
ship probability curves.
In what follows we will note the commonalities between the
Threshold Theory and the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen &
Steinberg, 1986). We will argue that this item response model
incorporates many of the assumptions made by the Threshold Theory
and hence allows for a rigorous formal test of them by applying the
model to an extensive categorization data set. We will also determine
whether the model is able to account for the semantic categorization
phenomena that were discussed by McCloskey and Glucksberg
(1978). More specifically we will verify whether the model can
account for inter- and intra-individual differences in categorization
and their relationship with item typicality. We will conclude by
discussing the manners in which the model can be employed to test
hypotheses regarding the nature of category representations and the
sources of categorization differences.
2. A probabilistic threshold model
The Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen & Steinberg, 1986) is an
item response model of which the properties are well understood. It
was developed within the context of aptitude testing where it is
employed to estimate individuals' proficiency with regard to a
number of questions of varying difficulty. It models the probability
that person p endorses item i. It does so by awarding both persons and
items a position along a common, latent scale. Their relative position
then determines the probability of endorsement. Person p's position
along the scale is indicated by θp. In the context of semantic
categorization θp can be understood to represent the person's
threshold criterion or the degree of liberalness/conservatism the
person displays when making categorization decisions. Each item i's
position along the scale is indicated by βiwhich in the current context
would represent the item's similarity to the category representation.
The difference between the two positions (i.e., the value of βi−θp)
determines the probability that pwill endorse i as a categorymember:
PrðYpi = 1Þ =
eαðβi−θpÞ
1 + eαðβi−θpÞ
ð1Þ
Eq. (1) expresses that the more βi exceeds θp on the latent scale,
the higher the probability of endorsing the item is, and vice versa. This
is reminiscent of the Threshold Theory's claim that categorization
decisions come about through the assessment of the similarity of the
item's representation to the category's representation. This assess-
ment results in the positioning of the items along a latent similarity
scale (i.e., fixing the items' βi values). The further along the scale an
item is positioned, the higher its similarity to the category
representation is assumed to be.
According to the Threshold Theory a threshold criterion is then
imposed on the scale to determine whether the assessed similarity
affords a positive rather than a negative categorization decision. We
take the value of θp to indicate the position of this threshold criterion.
The probability expressed in Eq. (1) decreases with θ. Low values of θp
indicate rather liberal categorizers for whom a modest degree of
similarity suffices to conclude category membership. High values of θp
characterize more conservative categorizers who require extensive
similarity between item and category to conclude category member-
ship. We thus take the differences in the estimates of θp to correspond
to the inter-individual differences in the placement of the categori-
zation threshold criterion the Threshold Theory proclaims.
In Eq. (1) an individual's response is not said to be deterministic.
Instead, the Rasch model expresses the probability with which an
individual will endorse a particular item. Depending on the relative
difference between the corresponding θp and βi values this probability
will differ. The resulting probability curve takes an S-shaped form,
starting off at a zero when the βi−θp difference is large and negative,
demonstrating a profound increase for small differences between βi
and θp, and leveling off again when the difference grows large and
positive.2 In this respect the model deviates from the original
Threshold Theory in which the threshold acts as a decision boundary
that rigorously separates members from non-members. According to
the original theory items are, without exception, classified as category
members when their similarity to the category representation
surpasses the person's threshold. Items whose similarity does not
surpass this threshold are not endorsed as category members. In the
modeling frameworkwe propose the difference between the values of
βi and θp determines the probability that pwill endorse i as a category
member. To highlight this difference with the original Threshold
Theory, one could term the Rasch model a probabilistic threshold
model.
2 To attain this characteristic, item response models originally assumed a
cumulative normal distribution. This was later changed to a logistic function so that
model estimation would become easier. The Threshold Theory originally also assumed
a cumulative normal distribution: Hampton (1998) employed a transformation of
categorization probability that would show a straight line function with typicality if
the membership curve follows the cumulative normal distribution (see our description
earlier). This assumption is somewhat relaxed in Eq. (1) that allows for a broader
range of probability curves. The inclusion of the α parameter in Eq. (1) allows to test
whether this relaxation is required. If α is estimated to lie close to 1.702 the probability
curves resemble a cumulative normal distribution. See in this respect footnote 2.
217S. Verheyen et al. / Acta Psychologica 135 (2010) 216–225
Author's personal copy
The probabilistic nature of the model becomes clear in Fig. 1 that
displays the positions of a single person (θp) and two items (βi and βj)
by means of tic marks along the horizontal axis. The items clearly
differ with respect to their similarity to the category representation.
Item i is less similar to the category than item jwhich is evidenced by
the former being located lower on the common scale than the latter.
The threshold of person p lies in between the two items. The black
curves in the figure indicate how the probability of endorsing the
items as category members changes as a function of θ. As βj surpasses
θp item j has a high probability of being endorsed by p. The dotted
vertical line at position θp in Fig. 1 crosses the black response curve
associatedwith βj close to a categorization probability of 1. βi does not
surpass θp and therefore has a low categorization probability
associated with it. The dotted vertical line at position θp crosses the
black response curve associated with βi close to a categorization
probability of 0.
Now imagine a person whose θ is located to the left of both
items. βi and βj then surpass the categorization threshold and both
would have high categorization probabilities associated with
them. Imagine a person whose threshold is located much further
along the latent similarity scale than that of person p. In fact, the
degree of similarity this person requires to favor a positive
membership decision is that high that neither βi nor βj surpasses
the corresponding θ. Inspection of Fig. 1 confirms that both items
would have a low probability of being endorsed.
The Rasch model thus allows a categorization decision to be
considered the outcome of a chance experiment of which θp and βi
are the parameters. If we assume these parameters to remain the
same, multiple repetitions of the experiment will not always result
in the same categorization decision. With each repetition of the
experiment, the probability that a person with a particular θp
value will endorse an item with a particular βi value as a category
member is given by Eq. (1). The converse probability represents
the probability that the person will not endorse the item as a
category member. Depending on the values of these probabilities,
a particular categorization response might be more or less suspect
to change from one occasion to the other. In the item response
models literature this interpretation of the probabilities associated
with θp is known as the stochastic subject interpretation. It opens
up the possibility to have the Rasch model account for intra-
individual categorization differences without having to posit that
they are due to changes in the persons' categorization threshold.
Indeed, from McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) it is known that
the vagueness of semantic categorization may be seen in both
inter- and intra-individual categorization differences. In their
study, different participants did not agree on the items that
could be considered category members, but individual respon-
dents also changed their mind when they were queried about the
same items a month later. Within the Threshold Theory frame-
work differences in threshold location are thought responsible for
both kinds of differences (e.g., Hampton, 1995). Like the Threshold
Theory, the Rasch model associates inter-individual categorization
differences with differences in threshold criteria (i.e., θp values).
The model provides a different account of intra-individual
categorization differences, however. The theory is agnostic as to
why participants would employ a different threshold criterion in a
categorization session that is only different from the previous one
in that it is organized one month later. In its current form it would
have to rely on extraneous justifications to provide a satisfying
account of intra-individual categorization differences. The Rasch
model, on the other hand, offers an inherent explanation of these
categorization differences by positing that the process that
underlies categorization decisions is probabilistic in nature.
Although the conversion of the deterministic Threshold Theory
into a probabilistic threshold model might thus involve a deviation
from the original, we believe this to be warranted since it
promises to address both inter- and intra-individual categorization
differences in a single framework without harm to the original
theory's interpretation or need to rely on extraneous justifications.
In the following section we will introduce a categorization
study involving 8 natural language categories with 24 items each.
Because the nature of the items that are to be categorized might
vary across the different categories, a different scaling of the
response functions (the black curves in Fig. 1) might be required
for each category. To this end we have included a parameter α in
Eq. (1) that is constant across all items of a category but can vary
from one category to the other. The Rasch model as expressed in
Eq. (1) will be fit to the data from the categorization study to
assess its appropriateness. This will determine whether categori-
zation decisions indeed come about through the placement of
threshold criteria along a latent scale. To verify whether the
interpretation of the latent scale in terms of items' similarity to
the category representation is justified, the correlation of the
resulting βi's with typicality ratings provided by independent
participants will be calculated. If typicality can be assumed to
increase linearly with similarity and the latent dimension can be
interpreted as a specific category's similarity scale, a category's βi's
should correlate strongly with that category's typicality ratings.
The availability of typicality data also allows us to establish
whether the Rasch model can account for the McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) finding that inter- and intra-individual differ-
ences in categorization are most prevalent among items of
intermediate typicality. This would further validate the Rasch
model and the interpretation of its parameter estimates and
associated probabilities.
A more general version of the model in which a separate αi is
estimated for each item will also be fitted to the categorization
data. This model is known as the two-parameter logistic model or
2PLM as it comes with two parameters (βi and αi) for every item
(Birnbaum, 1968). This allows the shape of the probability
response curves of different items to differ from one another.
The 2PLM wouldn't require the slope of the probability curves of
βi and βj in Fig. 1 to be the same, for instance. The 2PLM and the
Rasch model are often used next to one another in the item
response literature. The main reason for including the 2PLM in the
current analyses is to verify whether any important deviations
from the categorization patterns suggested by the Rasch model
exist that need to be substantiated. Possible explanations of such
deviations have been proposed by Hampton (1998, 2010) and
include the familiarity of the items, the ambiguity of the items, the
believe that they can technically be considered category members
or not, and the belief that membership is dependent on whether
one takes the category in a broad or in a narrow sense. Similar
systematic deviations that allow for a substantive interpretation
have been found in other applications of the 2PLM within the
semantic literature (e.g., Verheyen & Storms, 2010).
Fig. 1. Illustration of the probabilistic threshold model.
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3. Method
3.1. Participants
Two hundred and ninety first year psychology students at the
University of Leuven participated for partial fulfillment of a course
requirement. Two hundred and fifty of them completed a categori-
zation task. The remaining forty students provided typicality ratings.
All participants were fluent speakers of Dutch.
3.2. Materials
Categories and items were taken from Hampton, Dubois, and Yeh
(2006) who constructed 8 categories with 24 items each to study
contextual influences on categorization. The categories consisted of
two animal categories (fish and insects), two artifact categories
(furniture and tools), two borderline artifact-natural-kind categories
(fruits and vegetables), and two activity categories (sciences and
sports). The corresponding category items included both clear
members, clear non-members, and borderline cases. All materials
were translated into Dutch.
3.3. Procedure
The data collection took place in a large class room where all
participants were present at the same time. Each of themwas handed
an eight page questionnaire to fill out. The students participating in
the categorization task were told to carefully read through the 24
items on each page and to decide for each item whether or not it
belonged in the category printed on top of the page. Participants
indicated their answer by either circling 1 for yes or 0 for no. They
were also given the opportunity to indicate that a particular item was
unknown to them. The categorization task took about 15 min to
complete.
The students participating in the typicality rating task were to
indicate on a 7-point rating scale how typical they found the 24 items
printed on each page to be of the category displayed on top. It was
explained to them that high responses on the scale were to indicate
that an item was very typical of the category, while low responses
were to indicate that it was very atypical. They too were given the
opportunity to indicate that a particular item was unknown to them.
The typicality rating task took on average 20 min to complete.
4. Results
Participants rarely indicated that an itemwas unknown to them. A
number of participants did omit responses without specifying that the
corresponding items were unknown to them. Across the categoriza-
tion and typicality rating task less than 2% of data points weremissing.
Two tailed t-tests indicated that the number of missing responses did
not correlate significantly with the average of the categorization or
typicality ratings in either of the categories (all pN.05). Fig. 2 holds the
averaged results of both tasks. For every category, the probability of
making a positive membership judgment was plotted against the
respective items' average typicality. Average typicality appeared to be
a good predictor of categorization probability. A few exceptions
notwithstanding, the probability of making a positive categorization
decision increased with typicality. While the atypical and very typical
items afforded decisions that are quite stable across participants, the
decisions for the items of intermediate typicality were more volatile.
This resulted in items that are atypical of the category receiving
categorization probabilities that are close to 0, items that are of
intermediate typicality receiving categorization probabilities that
span almost the entire probability range, and highly typical items
receiving categorization probabilities that are close to 1.
Fig. 2. Scatterplots of the probability of a positive categorization versus average item typicality.
219S. Verheyen et al. / Acta Psychologica 135 (2010) 216–225
Author's personal copy
Averaged results that are similar to the ones that are presented
here, have been taken to support the Threshold Theory in the past
(Hampton, 1998). The notion of a threshold, which is a characteristic
of individual categorizers, is absent in analyses that are conducted at
the aggregated level, however. To lend credibility to the Threshold
Theory we therefore analyzed the categorization decisions using the
Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen & Steinberg, 1986). If the model
can be shown to fit the categorization data, this would substantiate
Threshold Theory's claim that categorization decisions come about
through the placement of individual decision criteria along a latent
scale that also holds the items. If the items' positions along this latent
scale can then be shown to correlate with rated typicality, the
proclaimed relationship between categorization and typicality can be
said to hold at the level of individual participants, not just at the
aggregated level.
4.1. Validating the model
The Rasch model was fit to each category's categorization data
using specialized software for item response analyses. The R
package ltm employs Marginal Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MMLE) to obtain estimates of βi, θp, and α. For each of the eight
included categories, 24 β estimates (one for every item i), 250 θ
estimates (one for every participant p), and one estimate of α
were thus obtained. In fitting the 2PLM to each category's
categorization data, 24 α estimates (one for every item i) were
obtained in addition to 24 β estimates and 250 θ estimates. Details
of the R procedures can be found in Rizopoulos (2006). The
typicality ratings, which were provided by an independent group
of participants, were introduced after the model estimation to give
a substantive interpretation of the βi estimates.
It is important to note that the MMLE approach that was taken
to estimate both models is just one of many procedures to have
been proposed for item response model estimation (for an
overview see Baker & Kim, 2004). As a test on our conclusions
the Rasch model and 2PLM were also estimated under a Bayesian
approach using WinBUGS (Kim & Bolt, 2007; Lunn, Thomas, Best,
& Spiegelhalter, 2000). The conclusions of these analyses were the
same as the ones drawn following the MMLE analyses. The
reported conclusions thus do not hinge upon the employed
estimation procedure.
One can compare the relative fit of the models to the
categorization data using either the BIC statistic, the AIC statistic,
or the likelihood ratio test. The BIC relative goodness of fit
statistics for the various categories can be found in Table 1. For
fruits, vegetables, furniture, sciences, and sports the BIC indicated
that the improvement in fit does not warrant the extra parameters
the 2PLM incorporates. The Rasch BIC for these categories was
lower than the 2PLM BIC. For fish, insects, and tools the BIC
suggested these additional parameters are warranted. The 2PLM
BIC for these categories was lower than the Rasch BIC. The AIC
statistic and the likelihood ratio test, on the other hand, indicated
the 2PLM to be the relatively better fitting model for all eight
categories. The three test statistics thus do not yield a uniform
answer to the question of which model should be preferred.
Therefore, to assess whether the Rasch model or the 2PLM is the
more suitable model for the categorization data, an omnibus test
(described in Tuerlinckx & De Boeck, 2005) was performed. Unlike
the BIC statistic, the AIC statistic, and the likelihood ratio test, the
omnibus test constitutes an absolute measure of fit. We therefore
consider it an appropriate arbitrator in choosing between the
Rasch model and the 2PLM.
The omnibus test entails a comparison of the deviance, defined
as −2 times the natural logarithm of the maximum likelihood,
that was obtained after fitting either the Rasch model or the 2PLM
to the categorization data, with 100 replicated deviance values.
These were obtained by simulating 100 replicated data sets
according to the models' estimated parameters and re-fitting the
model to these data sets. The resulting deviances are then used to
estimate the pˆ-value of a goodness of fit test as follows:
pˆ =
1
100
∑
100
j=1
Iðdevrepj N devobsÞ; ð2Þ
where devjrep refers to the deviance obtained from the jth replicated
data set and I(C) is the indicator function taking value 1 if condition C
is true and 0 otherwise. If a model fits the data, the observed deviance
should not differ too much from the simulated deviances, resulting in
a p ̂-value that is close enough to .50. The second column of Table 2
holds the obtained p ̂-values for the Rasch model. The third column
holds those obtained for the 2PLM. The Rasch p ̂-values did not deviate
strongly from .50 indicating a sufficiently good fit of the Rasch model
to the semantic categorization data. The 2PLM p ̂-values, on the other
hand, were close to 1 indicating that the model's estimated
parameters might provide a good fit to the empirically obtained
data, but do not allow generalization to data sets that might have been
obtained as well. We therefore believe the 2PLM to overfit the data
and the Rasch model to be the preferred model for the categorization
data.3
Since the omnibus tests that were performed constitute tests of the
absolute fit of the Raschmodel to the categorization data, the p̂-values
Table 1
BIC relative goodness of fit statistics for the Rasch model and the 2PLM.
BIC
Category Rasch 2PLM
Fruits 3437.68 3500.12
Vegetables 3597.09 3641.92
Fish 4209.25 4071.85
Insects 4853.11 4838.51
Furniture 3720.40 3736.67
Tools 4221.28 4179.51
Sciences 4784.56 4809.06
Sports 3824.12 3842.51
Table 2
Omnibus absolute goodness of fit statistics for the Rasch model and the 2PLM.
p̂
Category Rasch 2PLM
Fruits .62 .96
Vegetables .70 .95
Fish .58 .82
Insects .69 .81
Furniture .76 .96
Tools .73 .92
Sciences .46 .90
Sports .53 .84
3 The model in Eq. (1) with α fixed at 1 has many applications in the item response
literature. In the current context it can be set off against the Rasch model to verify
whether it was worthwhile having a different α estimated for each category. All three
relative goodness of fit statistics and the omnibus absolute goodness of fit test
indicated that this was the case. The BIC, AIC, and likelihood ratio test indicated that
the Rasch model with estimated α was the preferred model, except for fruits and
vegetables. A similar conclusion was reached based on the omnibus test. It indicated
that the Rasch model with α fixed at 1 provided a sufficiently good fit to the
categorization data for fruits and vegetables, but not for the data of any of the other
categories. Note that this does not impact on the conclusions reported in the text as α
was of course estimated to lie close to 1 when the Rasch model in Eq. (1) was fit to the
fruits and vegetables categorization data. For none of the categories was α estimated to
lie close to 1.702 (the maximum estimated α was 1.468). If it were, the logistic
function relating the latent dimension to response probability would closely resemble
a cumulative normal distribution.
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that were obtained can also be taken to indicate that semantic
categorization occurs through the placement of decision criteria along
a common, latent dimension by individual respondents. Along this
dimension the various potential category members are organized.
This is in line with the assumptions of the Threshold Theory. To lend
further support for the Rasch model as a proper formalization of the
Threshold Theory, the latent dimension on which the model situates
both persons' criteria and items is to represent similarity to the
category representation. If we assume a linear relationship between
typicality and similarity as did Hampton (1998, 2007), this proves to
hold. The correlation between βi and average rated typicality was
established at .96 for fruits, .97 for vegetables, .94 for fish, .97 for insects,
.97 for furniture, .97 for tools, .94 for sciences, and .98 for sports. These
were all very close to the maximum correlations afforded by the
reliability of the typicality ratings. The split-half correlations with
Spearman–Brown correction were estimated at .99, .99, .98, .98, .99,
.99, .96, and .99, respectively.
4.2. Accounting for the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) findings
The aim of the previous section was to establish whether the
Threshold Theory holds at the level of individuals making categori-
zation decisions. By demonstrating that the Rasch model is an
appropriate model for semantic categorization, we provided evidence
for the Threshold Theory's claim that individuals' categorization
decisions come about through the placement of an individual criterion
on a scale that is common to all categorizers. A strong linear
relationship between the items' locations along the scale and their
rated typicality provided evidence that the similarity of the items'
representations towards the category's representation is at the basis
of semantic categorization.
The Rasch model differs in one important respect from the original
Threshold Theory. It is probabilistic, rather than deterministic: The
further along the scale an item is located from an individual's
criterion, the higher the probability that the individual will endorse
the item, and vice versa. Because of this we thought it appropriate to
term the Rasch model a probabilistic threshold model. Before, we
already mentioned that we believe the probabilistic nature of the
model to be an asset in that it promises to account for intra-individual
differences, next to inter-individual differences in semantic catego-
rization. McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) were the first to
demonstrate the vagueness of semantic categorization through
these differences. In this section we reiterate their findings and assess
whether the Rasch model is able to bring them about for the data set
under study.
When individuals require a different degree of similarity before to
endorse an item as a category member, inter-individual differences in
categorization arise. McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) demonstrated
that disagreement among categorizers is the highest for items of
intermediate typicality. They calculated the proportion of nonmodal
categorization responses at each level of the 10-point typicality scale
they employed. At typicality level 4 the proportion was the highest
with a value of .36. The proportion of nonmodal responses dropped off
quickly towards both ends of the typicality scale. The same holds true
for the categorization data under study. The proportion of nonmodal
categorization responses was established at .02, .08, .28, .37, .27, .08,
and .02 at the seven points of the typicality scale we employed.
In the Rasch model every categorizer-item-pair is associated with
a value between 0 and 1 expressing the probability that the particular
categorizer will endorse the item she is faced with. The extent to
which this probability deviates from 1 or 0 for items that on average
will or will not be endorsed as category members, respectively,
constitutes a direct measure of the probability of providing a
nonmodal response. If the average categorizer is likely to endorse
item i as a category member and the probability that categorizer c
endorses i is .83, for instance, there is a 17% probability that she will
provide the nonmodal response ‘not a member’. In order to account for
the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) data on inter-individual
differences in categorization, the probability of providing a nonmodal
response predicted by the Rasch model should drop off from items of
intermediate typicality to items that are at the extreme ends of the
typicality scale.
For each level of the typicality scale that we employed in our study,
Fig. 3 expresses the probability of a nonmodal response as predicted
by the Rasch model. To allow comparison with the results reported by
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) the predicted probability was
calculated across all categorizers and categories (in the manner that
was demonstrated before). Nonmodal responses appearedmost likely
for items that were judged to be of intermediate typicality. The
highest probability was predicted at typicality level 4 of the 7-point
typicality scale. The probability of a nonmodal response was
estimated at .36 for this typicality level. At typicality levels 3 and 5
nonmodal responses were still likely to occur, with estimates of .28
and .26, respectively. At the atypical end of the scale the probability of
a nonmodal response was much lower with probabilities of .07 and
.02 for typicality levels 2 and 1. A similar drop was noticeable at the
highly typical end of the scale. The probability of a nonmodal response
was estimated at .08 for typicality level 6 and at .02 for typicality level
7. The results are in accordance with our own empirical findings and
those by McCloskey and Glucksberg, indicating that the Rasch model
correctly predicts the occurrence of nonmodal responses to be a
function of typicality, with inter-individual differences occurring
more often among items of intermediate typicality than among
atypical or highly typical items.
A similar conclusion was reached by McCloskey and Glucksberg
(1978) for intra-individual differences in categorization. These were
found to occur most often for items of intermediate typicality as well.
The proportion of within-categorizers inconsistencies was deter-
mined to be the highest at typicality level 4 of 10 with a value of .22.
Hampton et al. (2006) also studied within-categorizers inconsisten-
cies. They used the same stimuli we employ here, to establish the
proportion of inconsistencies at the middle of the typicality scale
around .18. At none of the other levels of the typicality scale was this
proportion found to be higher. As was indicated before, in the Rasch
model the probability associated with an individual encountering a
particular item to categorize has a natural interpretation in terms of
intra-individual differences. We referred to this interpretation of the
probabilities as the stochastic subject interpretation. If the probability
with which categorizer c will endorse item i is .77, for instance, the
probability that she will provide the opposite response is .23. If we
determine the probability that categorizers will deviate from their
most likely response for all items and determine the average of these
probabilities for each level of the typicality scale, we can verify
whether the Rasch model correctly predicts the McCloskey and
Fig. 3. Probability of nonmodal responses as a function of typicality level.
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Glucksberg finding that these deviations are most likely for items of
intermediate typicality. Note that the manner in which the probabil-
ities of within-categorizers inconsistencies are derived is different
from the procedure to obtain the probability of nonmodal responses.
To determine the probability of a person's nonmodal response for
item i reference was made to the dominant categorization decision
across categorizers. To determine the probability of a person's
inconsistency, we will make reference to that person's dominant
response to i. In the above example the latter probability was
estimated to be .23. If the dominant response across categorizers for
item i would be to deny it as a category member, the probability of a
nonmodal response by categorizer c would be estimated at .77.
Fig. 4 shows the probability of a categorization inconsistency
predicted by the model, averaged across persons and categories, for
each level of the typicality scale. The Rasch model expressed
inconsistencies to be most likely for items of intermediate typicality.
The highest probability was predicted at typicality level 4 with a value
of .26. The probabilities at typicality levels 3 and 5 were somewhat
smaller with estimates of .23 and .21, respectively. The probability of a
categorization inconsistency then quickly dropped off toward both
ends of the typicality scale. Atypical items were associated with an
average inconsistency probability of .07 at typicality level 2 and .02 at
typicality level 1. Typical items were associated with a low average
inconsistency probability as well. At typicality level 6 this probability
was estimated at .07. At typicality level 7 it was estimated at .02. The
results are in accordance with the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978)
finding and its replication by Hampton et al. (2006). The Rasch model
correctly identifies the items of intermediate typicality to be those for
which categorization inconsistency is most likely.
In addition, the model correctly indicated the probability of within-
categorizers inconsistencies to be lower than the probability of
between-categorizers differences at the intermediate level of typicality.
While in Fig. 4 the maximum probability was estimated at .26, it was
estimated at .36 in Fig. 3. In McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) the
maximumproportion of inconsistencieswas estimated at 22%, while the
maximum proportion of nonmodal responses was estimated at 36%.
This finding allows one to compare the Rasch model, which
includes a separate threshold for every participant, to a related
model that assumes all participants to employ the same threshold
criterion.4 In all other respects the Rasch model and this dummy
model are the same. The latter model was also fitted to the
categorization data under study. Unlike the Rasch model, it
predicted the probability of inconsistencies to be as high as the
probability of nonmodal responding. This is clearly not in line with
the McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) findings, where intra-
individual differences were found to be less prevalent than inter-
individual differences.
4.3. Investigating threshold criterion stability
The results above support the Threshold Theory in general, and the
Raschmodel in specific, as a framework for the study of what one could
call “traditional” semantic categorization behavior. With the model
offering estimates of individuals' threshold criteria θp it also becomes
possible to study aspects of semantic categorization that have been
rather neglected. One could, for instance, investigate to what extent the
degree of liberalness/conservatism exhibited by a person in one
category generalizes to another. To this end we correlated the
participants' θp estimates for the eight natural language categories
they were presented with. One-tailed t-tests indicated that 22 of these
(8×7)/2=28 correlations were significant at the .05 level of signifi-
cance. A one-sample t-test on the Fisher z transformations of the
correlations indicated these correlations to come from a distribution
with a mean greater than zero (t(27)=9.97,pb.001, one-tailed).
Despite the fact that the correlations were of moderate magnitude
(the maximum correlation, between furniture and tools, only reached
.34) these results point toward a considerable amount of stability in
categorization behavior. In what follows we will discuss how the Rasch
model can be extended to uncover sources of variability and stability in
semantic categorization.
5. General discussion
Because of differences in range and discriminatory power, typicality
and degree or probability of categorymembership have been said to tap
into fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations
(Osherson & Smith, 1997). The fact that gradedmembership is bounded
between 0 and 1, while typicality is thought of as being unbounded, is
generally taken to support this argument. The Threshold Theory
(Hampton, 1995, 2007) contests these claims. It states that both notions
relate to a single underlying dimension: Typicality is understood to
increase linearly with a metric of similarity, while degree of category
membership is assumed to increase monotonically with this similarity
metric.Hampton (1998)has provided evidence for these assumptionsat
the aggregated level. If one averages across respondents' discrete
categorization decisions, a continuousmeasure of categorymembership
arises that increases monotonically with typicality. At the level of
individual participants, however, the Threshold Theory has to account
for the discrete categorization decisions that are made. It does so by
assuming that participants place a threshold criterion on the similarity
metric that distinguishes categorymembers from non-members. As the
similarity metric is assumed common to all participants, they are all
suspected to adhere to itwhenmakingcategorizationdecisions: An item
that is low in similarity to the category representation should be less
likely to be endorsed than an item that is higher in similarity by every
single respondent. Of course participants can differ in the degree of
similarity they require to endorse an item (i.e. the placement of the
threshold criterion). In fact, these individual differences are required for
the monotonically increasing relationship of the averaged category
membership measure with similarity and typicality to come about. If all
respondents employed the same threshold criterion, averaging across
their categorization decisions would result in a discrete measure of
category membership instead of a continuous one. McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) already established that there are inter-individual
differences in categorization, especially for items that are of interme-
diate typicality.
Weadvanced an itemresponsemodel to formally assesswhether the
categorization decisions made by individual respondents adhere to the
Threshold Theory assumptions. The Rasch model (Rasch, 1960; Thissen
& Steinberg, 1986) is the formal equivalent of the Threshold Theory in
that it assumes that categorization decisions come about through the
Fig. 4. Probability of within-categorizers inconsistencies as a function of typicality level.
4 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this comparison.
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placement of a decision criterion along a latent scale that is common to
all categorizers. The model awards both categorizers and items a
position along this scale. The relative position of categorizer and item
determines whether or not the item will be endorsed. The more the
item's position exceeds the categorizer's position along the scale, the
more likely it becomes that the item will be endorsed, and vice versa.
The categorizers' positions can therefore be understood as their
threshold criteria, while the items' positions can be thought to reflect
their similarity to the category representation. We termed the Rasch
modelwith this interpretationof its parameters aprobabilistic threshold
model.
The Raschmodel was applied to categorization data for eight natural
language categories. For each of these data sets the model analysis
yielded an underlying dimension along which both items and persons
could be located. The items' positions were shown to correlate strongly
with average typicality as rated by independent judges. This validated
the Threshold Theory at the level of individual categorizers. In addition,
we showed that the Rasch model demonstrated the relationship
between inter-individual differences in categorization and typicality
thatMcCloskey andGlucksberg (1978) had established. They found that
nonmodal categorization responses were most prevalent among items
of moderate typicality. The same was true when the expected
proportion of nonmodal responses was expressed as the modeled
probability that categorizers would deviate from the average categori-
zation decision according to the Rasch model.
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) established that intra-individ-
ual differences in categorization follow a similar pattern. Items of
intermediate typicality are most likely to receive different categori-
zation decisions on various occasions. While the original Threshold
Theory explicitly accounted for inter-individual categorization differ-
ences by assuming that different categorizers employ different
threshold criteria, it has not been that explicit about these intra-
individual differences in categorization. In order to account for them
the Threshold Theory would have to propose that individuals'
threshold criteria change from one occasion to the other. This follows
from its assumption that categorization involves a deterministic
decision process that always results in items surpassing the threshold
being endorsed as category members, and items falling below the
threshold always being considered non-members. Although this
could certainly be a valid position to take, one could also make the
possibility of a change in categorization decision inherent to
the relative position of the item and the person's threshold. This is
the approach taken in the Rasch model. The closer to each other the
positions of threshold and item are estimated to be, the higher
the probability of a categorization change. This is the case because in
the Rasch model a categorization decision is considered the outcome
of a chance experiment constituted by parameters θp and βi. In the
event that both parameters are estimated to be the same, Eq. (1)
establishes the probability of p endorsing i at .5, indicating that the
categorization decision could go either way. This is also apparent in
Fig. 1. When θp is estimated to coincide with either βi or βj, the
corresponding response functions indicate the categorization proba-
bility to equal .5. Consequently, it would be considered highly likely
that person p would provide different answers on two categorization
occasions. When the expected proportion of within-categorizers
inconsistencies was determined according to this uncertainty that
the Rasch model associates with each categorization decision, it was
found that it was most prevalent for items of intermediate typicality.
Its ability to demonstrate the McCloskey and Glucksberg findings on
inter- and intra-individual categorization differences lends further
credibility to the model.
5.1. Explanatory item response models
Our main endeavor here has been to establish whether or not the
Rasch model is a suitable model for semantic categorization behavior.
Because of this, the presented work is of an exploratory nature: Item
response models were applied to empirical data, their fit was
assessed, and attempts were made to relate the constituting
parameters to an external empirical measure. As the Rasch model
constitutes the first formal instantiation of the Threshold Theory, we
deemed such an exploratory approach warranted in order to establish
the model's appropriateness. It is, however, also possible to take an
explanatory approach in which the external empirical measures are
brought into the models (De Boeck & Wilson, 2004). Item and/or
person characteristics are then incorporated in the item response
models to test whether they can account for the variability found
among the item and person parameters, respectively.
Up until now we have been fairly quiet about the nature of the
dimension that underlies the participants' semantic categorization
decisions. We noted that it expresses the similarity of the items
towards the category (i.e., typicality), but we did not elaborate on the
nature of the representations involved (e.g., stored exemplars, an
abstracted central tendency,…— see Komatsu, 1992 for an overview).
If one had specific hypotheses about the measures that determine an
item's position along the latent scale one could test these by
expressing the βi's as a linear combination of these predictors. For
instance, according to the generalized polymorphous concept model,
the similarity between an item and a category can be expressed as a
weighted combination of the number of characteristic features shared
by item and category, and the number of features that are distinct to
the item (Dry & Storms, 2010). Dry and Storms demonstrated how
both common and distinctive feature information play a role in the
prediction of items' typicality ratings (i.e., item–category-similarity).
If one would want to learn whether and to what extent this finding
generalizes to categorization, one could do so by employing the linear
logistic test model (Fischer, 1995; Janssen, Schepers & Peres, 2004).
This model can be considered an explanatory version of the Rasch
model in that it expresses the βi's as a linear combination of item
predictors, in this case feature commonality (FC) and feature
distinctiveness (FD):
βi = γ0 + γFCFCi + γFDFDi + εi with εi∼Nð0;σ2ε Þ ð3Þ
with γFC and γFD expressing the effects of feature commonality and
feature distinctiveness, respectively, and γ0 taking the role of
intercept. When incorporated in the Rasch model, (3) would allow
for a test of the generalizability of the positive contribution of
common features and the negative contribution of distinctive features
to item–category-similarity, found by Dry and Storms. One could also
imagine using this model to test whether different kinds of categories
differ with respect to the relative contribution of common and
distinctive features (e.g., natural kinds versus artifacts or concrete
versus abstract categories; see also Stukken, Verheyen, Dry, & Storms,
2009).
To further strengthen the proposed interpretation of βi, we
constructed an explanatory version of the Rasch model in which βi
is regressed upon rated typicality in the same manner βi is regressed
upon feature commonality and feature distinctiveness in Eq. (3).
Where before the typicality ratings were introduced after the model
had been estimated to aid interpretation of its parameters, the effect
of rated typicality on the βi's is now determined while the model is
applied to the categorization data. In all eight categories typicality
proved to be a significant predictor of the items' positions along the
latent scale, accounting for 96% of the variance in βi for the fruits
category, 94% for vegetables, 90% for fish, 95% for insects, 96% for
furniture, 95% for tools, 90% for sciences, and 97% for sports. The
estimated regression weight was positive in all categories, indicating
that the higher an item's typicality, the further along the latent scale it
is to be found. These same conclusions had been reached earlier, based
on the strong positive correlation between the (independent) βi
estimates and typicality ratings.
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5.2. Inter-individual differences in categorization
Just as external variables can be brought into the Rasch model to
explain the variability among the items, so external variables can be
brought into the model to elucidate the sources of variability among
persons (Van den Noortgate & Paek, 2004). At the theoretical level
there seems to be general agreement about semantic categorization
behavior resulting from the interplay of the respondents' individual
learning histories and the effects exerted by the immediate context
they find themselves in (e.g., Barsalou, 1993; Smith & Samuelson,
1997). Empirical investigations into the sources of inter-individual
differences in categorization are rare, however. Maybe this is the case
because up until now no principled way of determining individuals'
degree of liberalness/conservatism in semantic categorization existed.
The Rasch model does offer such a measure in the form of the
individuals' threshold criteria θp.
One could imagine employing the Rasch model to investigate
whether in semantic categorization there are systematic threshold
shifts with age (Bjorklund, Thompson, & Ornstein, 1983; Lin,
Schwanenflugel, & Wisenbaker, 1990). One only has to hear a child
discuss her immediate environment to realize that the extensions of
the categories she employs do not always match those held by adults.
Overextensions are probably the most commonly found extension
differences between children and adults. They occur when the child is
excessively liberal in allowing items into a category (Clark, 1973). A
child that refers to all four-legged animals as dogs, for example, is
making an overextension error. The reverse phenomenon – an
excessively conservative use of a category label – is called an
underextension (Nelson, 1974). It occurs when the child restricts
the use of dog to German shepherds only, for example. Under-
extension is much less likely to be noted than overextension in a
child's spontaneous speech, since it involves the absence of a
behavior. A categorization task like the one we employed in the
current study might be ideally suited to detect underextension errors
since it requires overt behavior from the child. If the Rasch model
could be fit to categorization data of various age groups simulta-
neously and systematic shifts (either more conservative or more
liberal placement of the categorization threshold with age) in the
person parameters θp could be shown to exist, considerable
understanding of the manner in which children acquire categories
can be achieved. Indeed, the compatibility of the Rasch model and
such developmental data would establish that young children already
know about the single dimension that underlies categorization
decisions, but do not yet agree with adults on the appropriate region
to place the categorization threshold. If such results would be cast in
the terminology of the previous section, they could be taken to
suggest that even young children know about the characteristic
features that make up the underlying dimension, but do not accord
them the same weight in categorization as adults do. This would
corroborate existing theories of concept development (e.g., Johnson &
Eilers, 1998; Mervis, 1984, 1987). Alternatively, shifts in item
parameters across age groups would indicate a developmental
reorganization of the category structure (see for example Keil &
Batterman, 1984).
Similarly, one could imagine verifying whether a context manip-
ulation induces a change in the employed threshold criterion. Braisby
(1993, 2005) has noted that the clear context or purpose that helps
shape natural discourse is generally absent in categorization tasks as
they are performed in the psychology lab. He suggests that the
variability in categorization decisions might arise from the lack of a
clear context. Accordingly, Hampton et al. (2006) proposed a study in
which categorization decisions were to be made in one of two clearly
specified contexts. It was expected that in pragmatic contexts, people
would take a broad view of what may be included in a category,
whereas in technical contexts, the category boundarywould be drawn
more tightly. Contrary to these expectations, no difference was found
between the conditions in the overall proportion of positive
categorizations. In addition, categorization probabilities in each
condition correlated equally strongly with typicality ratings that
were provided by a group of participants who didn't receive a
specified task context. It would be interesting to see whether an
analysis using the Rasch model might have a better chance of
revealing context effects, as it takes the (typicality) structure of the
data into account and does not carry the danger of obscuring possible
important individual differences through aggregation.
Gardner (1953) was among the first to introduce the notion of a
threshold in the context of categorization behavior and to study inter-
individual differences therein. He argued for the existence of inter-
individual criterion levels that remain stable across different
categorization tasks. In other words, a respondent who is found to
be a rather conservative categorizer in one task, would also be
expected to employ a rather strict criterion level in another
categorization task. Following Gardner's suggestion we correlated
the participants' θp estimates for the eight natural language categories
they were presented with. The resulting correlations were found to
come from a distribution with a mean greater than zero. This result
lends support to Gardner's claim. Uncovering the personality
characteristics that are responsible for the relative stability of
categorization thresholds might therefore constitute another route
to take the Rasch model along in future research.
As a priori hypotheses concerning these relatively unexplored
matters might be scarce, one might want to start by establishing
whether there are groups of categorizers that differ substantially from
one another. Rather than assuming that all categorizers are alike or
that all categorizers are different from one another, one could look for
latent groups of similarly performing categorizers. This is the
approach taken by, among others, Lee and Webb (2005), Palmeri
and Nosofsky (1995), Vanpaemel and Navarro (2007), and Verheyen
and Storms (2007). It is straightforward to implement this demand for
potential latent classes in the framework of the Rasch model. Braeken
and Tuerlinckx (2009) illustrate how to employ a finite mixture
approach to solve the problem of determining the number of latent
person groupings in estimating an item response model. One can
imagine applying this procedure in the context of categorization to
determine the number and nature of categorizer groups that are
required. If the data permit, the Rasch model may be employed in this
manner to uncover groups of categorizers that adopt fundamentally
different category representations.
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